Article Source: China’s National Business Daily 2014-04-18

It was announced in a report issued by L&L Energy, Inc. (“L&L” or the “Company”) on April 14 that L&L was ready to be voluntarily delisted from NASDAQ. In the meantime, Dickson Lee, the founder of L&L Energy has already resigned from the positions of both Board Chairman & CEO and has been sued both by SEC and the Ministry of Justice of U.S for financial fraud, fake disclosure of information and forged signature. This incident has caused great sensation in the financial world. Yesterday, a NBD reporter made a phone call to Jianling Cao, one of L&L’s high-level management executives in China. She confirmed the foregoing news and claimed that the accusation against Dickson Lee was unrelated to the Company. She also stated that the Company will be in normal operation after delisting its common stock from NASDAQ.

As a matter of fact, NBD reporters had already conducted a series of in-depth investigations in both Yunnan and Guizhou provinces as early as last October. During these investigations, it was found that the sources of L&L’s $500 million revenue recorded in L&L’s financial report of fiscal 2013 remain unidentified. Also, the ownership of its coal mines is still in doubt. Then we may begin to wonder: what kind of company is L&L? Who is Dickson Lee? What accusations is he facing?

In the July of 2013, L&L submitted its 10-k financial report (hereafter referred to as 10-k) to U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”), in which it claimed that the total revenue derived from L&L’s coal washing business in China during the fiscal year of 2013 (from May 2012 to April 2013) amounted to $77.6 million (approximately 480 million RMB), occupying 39% of its total revenue in fiscal 2013, with profits of $8.2 million (approximately 50 million RMB).

It is claimed, in L&L’s financial report that as the major revenue source of the Company in fiscal 2013, coal-washing business is mainly operated in Yunnan L&L Taifung Mining Co. Ltd (“L&L Taifung”), a subsidiary of L&L. What is strange is that less than month after 10-k was released, L&L suddenly announced its sell of Hong Xing Coal Washing Facility, which is owned by L&L Taifung.

However, according to NBD reporters’ investigation, this coal washing facility was already shut down even before 2013. In addition, according to the document provided by local tax authority, the substantial revenue of Hong Xing Coal Washing Facility was very limited in 2012 and no tax was paid after the June of 2012.

Despite the fact that L&L Energy claimed the ownership of a coal washing facility called HunTai, it was verified by NBD reporters that HunTai was actually owned by another company. Furthermore, even the substantial revenue of HunTai cannot represent the huge source of its 500 million revenue claimed on L&L’s financial report.

The interview on the administrative and financial personnel in L&L TaiFung still failed to explain the source of L&L’s huge revenue. Even more intriguing is that the interview revealed more contradictions to the information previously released by L&L. Both U.S. office and the headquarter in Beijing declined the interview request under the excuse that they “have initiated legal proceedings.”

Profitable Coal Washing Facilities Are Sold

L&L Energy, Inc. is a NASDAQ listed enterprise in U.S. Although most of its business is operated in China, unlike other U.S listed Chinese stocks, its founder, board chairman and major shareholder, Li Weiche (Dickson Lee) is a Chinese American and the headquarter is located in the United States.

In response to the accusations made by the short seller, Jianling Cao, Vice manager of Kunming office of Yunnan L&L Taifung told NBD reporters the Company was intending to file a lawsuit against both GeoInvesting (hereafter referred to as Geo), the short seller report author and Seeking Alpha for spreading false allegations online at the purpose of short selling. But when it came to central issues such as the revenue of coal washing facilities, Jianling Cao refused to provide any relevant document under the pretext that “ these documents are protected as important legal proofs.”

In the end of July 2013, it was claimed in L&L’s 10-K that the predecessor of the Company is a Nevada corporation founded in 1999. After a series of acquisitions, the Company was listed in the U.S. stock market NASDAQ (NASDAQ: LLEN), in the business of producing, processing, and selling coal in both Yunnan and Guizhou provinces of People’s Republic of China.

“We have five coal mines, two coal washing facilities and three coal distributors. The Chinese headquarter is situated in Beijing and there are many other offices in Guiyang, Kunming and Taipei.” Said the 10-K report.

The total revenue of fiscal 2013 (from May 2012 to April 2013) was $198.98 million, with a total cost of $137.42 million and a total profit of $61.56 million, doubling the revenue of fiscal 2012. Coal washing business contributes $77.63 million (approximately 480 million RMB), or 39% to the total revenue, with a net profit of $8.19 million (approximately 50 million RMB).

During the fiscal 2013, 763,000 tons of coals were produced by L&L, with another 470,000 tons of coals being washed and 331,000 tons distributed. 10-K described the performance of coal washing business as “slightly increased”. With a total 474,000 tons, fiscal 2013 saw less than 10% or 0.4 tons of increase to the total amount of 434,000 tons in fiscal 2012.

In the introduction to its coal washing business, it is clearly stated in 10-K that “L&L only has two coal washing facilities, with an annual output of 480,000 tons; Hong Xing Coal Washing Facility is a third party facility (not a subsidiary of L&L); DaPuAn Mine is the sole service object for the DaPuAn coal washing equipment.” (P21). It is also pointed out in 10-k that “because of the reasons mentioned above, the revenue derived from coal washing business of DaPuAn is separately accounted”, which means that Hong Xing, the third party coal washing facility, is the sole contributor to the substantial revenue of L&L’s coal washing business in fiscal 2013.

In the downturn of the whole coal mining industry in China, Hong Xing should indisputably been deemed as an important contributor to L&L given that the coal washing business brought $8.2 million net profit to L&L in fiscal 2013. However, a notice was suddenly published on the official website of the Company on August 19, 2013, announcing that “ In a long-term perspective, due to the limited value of Hong Xing Coal Washing Facility to the Company, the executives have decided to call an abort to all the business in Hong Xing and is planning to sell it to any buyer interested in.”

This seemingly ordinary press triggered a series of doubts and debates. Consequently, GeoInvesting, a research institute in the United States released a short seller report on September 19, 2013, pointing out that Hong Xing Coal Washing Facility was actually shut down in 2012 and accusing L&L Energy of financial fraud and deceiving investors. As a result, the stock price of L&L fell to $1.27 per share. It was a 38.65% decrease.

On September 27, 2013, NBD reporter made a phone call to Ms. Zhang, the spokesperson for L&L in the Beijing Office. However she refused to disclose more information about the incident because they “have already initiated legal proceedings.”

The Closure of Hong Xing Was Verified by Many Parties

Why did L&L suddenly shut down Hong Xing Coal Washing Facility which contributed 40% of its annual revenue? How was the operational status of this plant in the fiscal year of 2013? Why did L&L fail to make any response to the doubts and disputes resting on its coal washing business? Is its financial record reliable?

Hong Xing is a privately-owned enterprise located in Walu, a village in Xiongbi Town, Shizong County of Yunnan Province. Being more than 20 miles away from the urban district of Shizong County, Hong Xing is adjacent to Lannigou Coal Mine and was built in 2004 by Hongxing Li who was the owner of this facility. The driveway to Hong Xing has been greatly damaged by heavy trucks and therefore is filled with surface water which causes hazards in raining days.

On October 19, 2013, at the top of a slope near DaShe Village, NBD reporters found Hong Xing Coal Washing Facility. However, what reporters saw were only deserted coal washing machines, dilapidated factory and collapsed walls. There was no sign to suggest that this plant was still in operation.

Several meters away was Lannigou Coal Mine, whose office building was only dozens of meters behind. At the gate of the office building hanged two white boards, on which it showed “Hong Xing Coal Washing Facility of Shizong County” and “Lannigou Coal Mine of Shizong County.” The characters were blurred and hardly visible.

“The mine has been idled for more than one year.” A Mr. Li who had worked in Lannigou for 23 years told the reporter. “There has been no more coal to wash since the devastating accident happened in SiZhuang Coal Mine.

The devastating disaster Mr. Li mentioned above was a tremendous coal mining accident happened in SiZhuang Mine of Shizong County, Qujing City, Yunnan Province on November 10, 2011. This accident caused 43 deaths and direct economic loss of 39.7 million RMB. For quite a long time after this accident, the name “Sizhuang” remained a sensitive word that no one in the county wanted to hear or mention. The coal mine was also idled for rectification.

Hongxing Li, the first owner of Hong Xing told the reporter despite the fact that Hong Xing was transferred to Yufu Ma, the boss of Shizong Fusheng Trade Company (hereafter referred to as Fusheng Company), Lannigou Mine was still owned by Li and was still in normal operation. Therefore, he would pay a visit to the mine almost every day. “Workers in Lannigou need to pass by Hong Xing to get to their workplace and they barely see the factory in operation.” Said Hongxing Li, “I can’t remember the exact date of its production halt, roughly around 2012.”

A single-storey house whose windows and doors were all shut down lies near Hong Xing, which, according to Mr. Li, was once the office of Hong Xing Coal Washing Facility. “It was converted to the residence for the door keeper of the factory.” “Door keepers are constantly being changed so they must know nothing about it.” A staff member of Walu Village Committee told the reporter that “Hong Xing stopped its coal washing business two years ago.”

Later the reporter found Yufu Ma, the second owner of Hong Xing in the office of Fusheng Company. He said that Hong Xing was bought from Mr. Li between the end of 2008 and the beginning of 2009. Later Laozhong Yang, one of his relatives joined in as a shareholder. But because of the clashes in their business philosophy, they terminated their cooperation in 2011 and Hong Xing was sold to Laozhong Yang in December of the same year. “Shortly after the coal washing facility was transferred to him, the factory stopped its operation.” Yufu Ma told the reporter.

The responsible person for the Department of Industry and Information Technology of Shizong County showed NBD reporters an internal document named “Above-sized Industrial Enterprises Information of Shizong County.”  This document was submitted to the Department by the coal authority of Shizong County on July 31, 2013. In this document, it mentioned that the total output value of Hong Xing Coal Washing Facility in 2012 was 86.77 million RMB, with a net profit of 7.56 million RMB and the tax payment amounted to 3.47 million. The Department described Hong Xing as “a subsidiary of HunTai Mining, co, ltd and it has halted its production because of the rectification and consolidation within the enterprise.” But in the column of “the target for 2013” remained blank. The responsible person (for the Department of Industry and Information Technology of Shizong County) offered an explanation for it: “Because the factory was idled in 2012, we thought it unnecessary to set a target for the next year.”

After several failed attempts to reach out to Laozhong Yang, one of his employees told reporters that “he is on a business trip in Kunming.” In fact, NBD reporter is not the only one looking for Mr. Yang. Officials in charge of industry in Shizong County also failed to reach contact with him. Yufun Ma told reporters that Mr. Yang had more than one phone number so it was difficult to reach him. “But if he wants to reach out to you, he will soon make it.” These words added mystery to this Mr. Yang.

Alleged Falsified Revenue

Another evidence that lends credit to the bleak operational status of Hong Xing Coal Washing Facility in 2012 is its low tax payments in that year. On October 21, 2013, NBD reporters paid a visit to Second Branch (“Second Branch”) of Shizong County Local Tax Bureau.  The director of the Bureau, named Kuansheng Li, provided a document that contained the tax payment information of Hong Xing in 2012.

It was suggested in this document that only 31,539 RMB tax was paid from January to June in 2012 and no more tax were paid after that. The short seller report released by Geo also mentioned this tax payment, and in L&L’s rebuttals they argued that “Geo has a misunderstanding of Chinese taxation policy and this local agency is only responsible for collecting some additional taxes rather than all taxes such as sales and income taxes.”

Kuansheng Li gave a full explanation of it.  He said that the national tax serves as the basis for collecting local tax. So in this situation, the local tax bureau collected 6% special surcharges based on the 17% of value-added tax paid to Shizong County National Tax Bureau. Included in the special surcharges were 1% of construction surcharges on the value-added tax, 2% of education surcharges and 3% of local education surcharges. The surcharges that amount to 6% are called “the tax of the tax”.

“The fact that Hong Xing was not operational in 2012 meant that it had produced neither revenue nor tax in that year,” Kuansheng Li told the reporter. “As for the local tax, Hong Xing directly paid to the Second Branch.”  Although Hong Xing stopped its operation, it has not filed for cancelling its registration. In that case, its duty to pay tax is not terminated. So Hong Xing has continued its tax declaration even after June 2012. However, due to its production halt, no tax was generated during the period, which is called “zero tax declaration.”  In other words, the total local tax paid by Hong Xing in the whole fiscal 2012 was 31,539 RMB.

According to the tax records provided by the Second Bureau, in April and May of 2012, Hong Xing paid 14642 RMB and 11922 RMB surcharges of value-added tax respectively, with another 5000 RMB of Stamp tax and Vehicle Tax. “The 17% of value-added tax paid to the National Tax Bureau was calculated on the basis of the sales. The actual payment amount is the portion after input VAT was deducted. In the analysis made by Jinghao Ma, a financial expert, he said “though we can’t get the exact revenue of Hong Xing in 2012 based on known clues, it can still be inferred that the major revenues of this plant are falsified, and so are its profits.”

In the meantime, the response from Shidong Wang, Director of Shizong County National Bureau also supported the foregoing inference. If it was true that the total revenue of Hong Xing was as high as $77.6 million (approximately 480 million RMB) as claimed in L&L’s financial report, then this factory must be an important and major taxpayer in Shizong County. However, responsible persons for the different local industrial and tax departments said they had no impression of such a coal washing facility.

As a matter of fact, for Dongshi Wang, the only impression on this facility was left by its tax arrears last year when he issued a tax reminder letter to Hong Xing. “The reminder letter needed my signature, so I have an impression on this facility.” Moreover, in the rectification notice issued by Shizong County Local Tax Bureau in April 2013, Hong Xing Coal Washing Facility was listed as failed to declare the tax payable.

“In terms of ongoing VAT regulations, an enterprises like Hong Xing cannot enjoy preferential policies. But as for income tax, Hong Xing is qualified to enjoy the ‘two-year exemption and three-year reduction’ policy.” Therefore, according to Jinghao Ma, “even if the report data is real, it is still contradictory to its tax payable.”

In addition, from the organization chart (P7) published in its 10-K, it is suggested that L&L is operating its business in China through a number of its wholly owned subsidiaries and companies in which it has absolute holdings. Yunnan L&L Taifung Mining Co, ltd, (hereafter referred to as L&L Taifung) is one of them.

According to public information, L&L Taifung is a Sino-US joint venture incorporated in December 2011 in Qujing City of Yunnan Province. Its legal person is Dickson Lee, the board chairman of L&L Energy while its Chinese partner is Laozhong Yang. It is suggested in the 10-K that L&L holds 98% of L&L Taifung’s equity and the Hong Xing Coal Washing Facility is a subsidiary of L&L Taifung.

However, the ownership of Hong Xing is also in doubt. According to the registration information provided by the local Industrial and Commercial Bureau, Hong Xing is a privately owned enterprise, with its legal person being Bin Liu, a local of Shizong County. Jianling Cao, the vice manager of the Kunming office of Yunnan L&L Taifung provided an explanation that “under the restriction of current policy, it is difficult to transfer this coal washing facility to L&L, therefore we adopted entrustment.” Jianling Cao told NBD reporters, “The executive legal person of Hong Xing is Bin Liu, who is entrusted by our company as the legal person. We have notarization; we have his finger print on it; we have the authorization and we have the testimony from the lawyer.”

Myths Around The Coal Washing Business

On October 7, 2013, L&L for the first time responded, on its official website, to the doubts on its coal washing business, correcting itself by saying that “There are two coal washing plants affiliated to the Company, Hong Xing and TaiFung”. In this response, L&L also declared that in the total revenues of coal washing in fiscal 2013, revenues from Hong Xing Coal Washing Facility accounted for only 20% of the company’s total sales while TaiFung accounted for 19%, and it reiterated that “Hong Xing was idled this summer by the company.  Hong Xing halted its production on June 30, 2013 and did not produce any income in July.”

Then does the TaiFung Coal Washing Facility really exist? What is its relationship with L&L TaiFung? Doubts and mysteries began to fall upon L&L’s coal washing business.

During the investigation, Yufu Ma [a former owner of the Hong Xing coal washing facility] was the first person to mention that L&L Taifung had a coal washing facility. He also told NBD reporters “equipment parts from Hong Xing were moved by them (Laozhong Yang) and placed in another coal washing plant.” “I don’t agree with their decisions because these equipment were costly.”

Afterwards, Yufu Ma provided the address of the coal washing facility to our reporters. Interestingly, this address coincided with the address of L&L Taifung provided by Zhoubao Du, the vice director of China Merchants [Group] of Shizong County, both being “Shizong County YiLa Industrial Park, next to the Kunming Steel coking plant.”  Surprisingly, this address directed NBD reporters neither to Hong Xing nor L&L Taifung, but to a place called “Coal Washing Facility of Shizong County Huntai Mining Co, Ltd” (hereafter referred to as the Huntai Coal Washing Facility).

In the morning of October 20, 2013, the reporter managed to make an appointment with Shulin Yang, the director of the Huntai Coal Washing Facility on the grounds of “being interested in the local coal industry investment.”  In response to the statement that L&L holds 80% equity of HunTai Coal Mine, Yang said that Laozhong Yang is his brother and that HunTai was built in June, 2012 with its sole investor being the natural person LaoZhong Yang.  On the other hand, L&L Taifung is a Sino-U.S joint venture.

Shulin Yang admitted that L&L Taifung owns only one coal washing facility, namely the Hong Xing Coal Washing Facility, the one that has been idled for a long time. “Hong Xing had no choice but to halt its production under complicated situations around 2012, such as the devastating coal mining accident in Shizhuang and the downturn of the whole industry.” “Hong Xing has been idled for more than one year.” Shulin Yang told the reporter, “There are only two coal washing facilities still operational, one being Huntai and the other being Minke (phonetic).”  The latter one is owned by a Sichuan investor so is of no relevance to them.

It is known that the biggest client of HunTai Coal Washing Facility is the Kungang Coking Plant, which is only several steps away from HunTai.  Shulin Yang told reporters that because of the downturn of the industry in 2013, their coal could hardly be sold, which greatly influenced their income. “Only 70,000 to 80,000 tons of coal has been washed since the first day of its operation in 2012, with limited revenue of only 50-60 million yuan.” “The coal price fell to 800 yuan per ton from 1000 yuan in 2012 and the net profit of Huntai was only less than 20 million yuan.”

Shulin Yang said, “because they don’t own any coal, L&L TaiFung has had no business for over a year.”

On the same grounds of “being interested in the local coal industry investment,” NBD reporters managed to meet JunAn Zhao, an accountant at L&L TaiFung, who said “HunTai Coal Washing Facility is a privately owned plant by the Chinese investor of L&L TaiFung (namely Laozhong Yang).”  JunAn Zhao also told reporters that as he had been in charge of the company’s finances since the establishment of L&L TaiFung, he was “very familiar” with the company’s situation.

“L&L TaiFung has only one coal washing facility, namely Hong Xing, which was temporarily shut down in June 2012 because of the downturn of the plant as well as the whole industry.” JunAn Zhao further revealed that “the coal washing business was transferred to the HunTai Coal Washing Facility” and “due to this affiliate relation, the office of L&L Taifung and HunTai has become one.” He also admitted that “Hong Xing hasn’t paid any tax since the production halt in June 2012.”

According to JunAn Zhao, the main business of L&L Taifung is the distribution and sale of coal. The total revenue in 2012 was 80 million yuan.  However, the [year-to-date] revenue dropped to 40 million yuan in June 2013 since the “coal washing business is only operated when the market is good, so it is not computed as an independent business section.”  Even if HunTai does belong to L&L Taifung, its revenue still cannot account for 39% of the total revenue of L&L as claimed by the Company. It is known from the document provided by the responsible person of the above-mentioned Department of Industry and Information Technology of Shizong County that the production value of Huntai from January to July in 2013 was 140 million yuan, but the losses were 83,000 yuan.  In addition, the profits of Huntai in 2012 were only 8.52 million yuan.

This argument is self-contradictory with the statement previously released by L&L that “there are two coal washing facilities.” It is also confirmed by Jianling Cao that L&L Taifung is a trade company mainly engaged in the wholesaling and retailing of coal, rather than coal washing. When asked about the statement published on the official website, Cao explained it as a “mistake in translation.”  From this we can see that L&L cannot even make a self-consistent statement.

Furthermore, JunAn Zhao didn’t agree with Shulin Yang’s statement that “L&L Taifung has no business for one year.” Instead, he said “There was no output only from the beginning of April or May to October of 2013.”

It is displayed, in a notification published in the official Website of the Ministry of Commerce in Qujing City on January 17, 2012, that “U.S L&L Energy and the Chinese company Yunnan Taifung Coal Mining, Ltd co-invested 50 million yuan in the project of coal washing, processing and circulation. Of the total investment, $6.7 million comes from foreign investment, of which $639,985 has already been executed.”

However, according to NBD reporter’s knowledge, as one of three major achievements of the “investment attraction project” of Shizong County in the Kunming Trade Fair in 2011, L&L Taifung is not very well known. Additionally, it was even issued a notice of criticism during the joint annual inspection of foreign-invested enterprises in Qujiang City in 2012.

Hongqing Dong, the director of the China Merchants [Group] even doesn’t know of the existence of such a Sino-U.S joint venture. And it is after a lot of enquires that the vice director Zhoubao Du finally got a rough picture of this company.

JunAn Zhao also told the reporter that L&L had so far only invested 15 million yuan into L&L Taifung. According to the agreement, the operation and revenue is independent from the U.S investor, which means L&L Taifung just needs to provide the U.S side with an annual return 12% of the invested capital. “The exact return amount has not been settled and it may need further discussions several years later.”

Coal Mine Ownership and Operational Status in Doubt

In the deep mountains of Yunnan and Guizhou Provinces of China, several unknown small coalmines are impacting the rises and falls of L&L Energy (LLEN, NASDAQ) (L&L or the Company). With the start of its coal business on 2010, this U.S. incorporated company has set up a seemingly elaborate and mysterious financial puzzle in China.

In an attempt to solve the mystery left by L&L, NBD reporters conducted a series of on-site investigations in many places of Guizhou and Yunnan provinces at the end of the October 2013. According to the L&L’s newest financial report, its business segments included five coal mines, two coal washing facilities, three coal trading platforms, and several offices.  It is found, according to NBD reporters’ on-site survey and interviews with governmental officials and many insiders, that apart from the unidentified source of its huge revenue from its coal washing business, many more doubts remain unresolved, including the ownership of the coalmine assets and the falsified revenues.

Additionally, it is also found that Dickson Lee, the former board chairman of L&L had played an essential role in the cross-border capitalization of several coal mine properties in the deep mountains of Southwest China. According to L&L’s announcement on April 7, Ministry of Justice of U.S. had already filed a lawsuit against Mr. Lee on March 27 for the crime of fraud.

Ownership of Coal Mining Assets in Doubt

It is suggested that, in the 10-k financial report (hereafter shorted as 10-k) submitted to SEC by L&L, the leading business of L&L lies in coal exploitation, with its five major coal mines located respectively in DaPuAn, ShuChong, Lashu, Luozhou and Weishe. The first two are located in Yunnan province and the rest three in Hezhang County of Guizhou Province. Other business sections including “distribution”, “coal washing” and “coking” are supplemented as “other coal mine opportunities.”

It is known from 10-K that L&L transferred cash, its 60% ownership in DaPing mine, and its 98% interest in Zonelin Coking Plant to Guizhou Union Energy Mining Co., Ltd. (hereafter referred to as Union Energy) and Guizhou Youyin Energy Mining Co., Ltd (hereafter referred to as Youyin Energy) in exchange for a 95% interest in the Luozhou and Lashu mines.

However, L&L corrected itself in the announcement released on October 25 2013 by claiming that the Company indirectly purchased Luozhou and LaShu by buying 95% shares of Guizhou Union XunDa and Guizhou Union WuZhou, both being subsidiaries of Union Energy.

In October 2013, NBD reporters conducted an on-site investigation on LaShu Mine. One of the responsible person for the mine called Zhi Zhang told reporters that LaShu Mine was acquired by Union Energy in 2010. He also added that “although there are other shareholders, (Union Energy) is the majority shareholder.”

Zhang Song, the vice manager of Administration Department of Union Energy in Hezhang County of Guizhou Province told NBD reporters that Union Energy owns seven coal mines in Hezhang County, including Luozhou, LaShu and Weishe. An article from the local media HeZhang Daily shows that Union Energy wholly purchased or bought controlling stake of seven coal mines which are Weishe, LaShu, Luozhou, Chengguan, AnLeXi, Hezhen and Dezhuo. Union Energy also has applied for the consolidator qualification.

Last January, a pilot scheme called A Work Plan for Coal Mines Consolidation of Guizhou Province mandated that every enterprise who acquires or regroups other smaller enterprises should have a minimum annual production capacity of 1.5 million tons. Also, a minimum designed production capacity of 20 million was required for Bijie City and Liu Panshui City. All the Guizhou coalmines owned by L&L failed to meet this requirement. What is more, L&L was not seen in the list of qualified consolidators released by Guizhou government.

During the survey on WeiShe Mine, NBD reporters encountered a Mr. Liu, who claimed to be the manager of the three mines mentioned above. When it came to the ownership of these mines, Mr. Liu said that in order to protect the coalmines during the coalmine consolidation in Guizhou Province, cooperation was made between L&L and Union Energy but (L&L) does not have stock share in Union Energy. Union Energy is the shareholder of the three mines mentioned above and is also responsible for the management on these three mines.

However, at the mention of the share certificate for the three coal mines which are allegedly owned by L&L, Mr. Liu told the reporter that the acquisition agreement is not available at the moment. “Since we have initiated legal proceedings, there is no more comment.” What is more, L&L failed to provide convincing supporting documents in all of its previous public responses.

As stated in L&L’s announcement, the acquisition process for LaShu Mine and Luozhou Mine had been completed at the end of 2012. However, as the legal merit of acquisition, the commercial registration cannot support its statement. It was found, at the end of last October, from the Administration of Industry and Commerce, that Union XunDa had been the sole owner of Luozhou Mine before September 2013, however, Union Energy was the sole owner of Union Xunda, rather than L&L or any of its subsidiaries. Moreover, Union Energy holds 90% interest of LaShu Mine, with another 10% held by the natural person Guo Yingquan. In addition, Union Energy is the sole owner of Union Wuzhou which does not hold any stock share of LaShu Mine.

According to the National Credit Information Public Disclosure System opened this March, Luozhou Mine and Weishe Mine are respectively owned by three and two natural persons while LaShu Mine is owned only by Guo Yingquan. In addition, yesterday (April 17), Qi Chen, the vice director of Administration of Industry, Economy, Trade and Energy of Hezhang County told NBD reporters in an interview that in the ownership structure reported by Union Energy, foreign ownership takes a part in WeiShe Mine whereas no foreign shares are found in Luozhou and Lasu Mines. However, he believed that this ownership structure might be a misrepresented and ownership structure has experienced a constant change in the consolidation of the coalmine industry.

The ownership of Yunnan DaPuAn Mine and ShuChong Mine is also in doubt. Based on the registering information provided by official website of the State Administration of Industry and Commerce of Yunnan province, ShuChong Mine is still a single-owner operated company, with Yang Yong being the responsible person for the mine. This fact contradicts to the information disclosed by L&L Energy that this mine is a joint-venture.

It is displayed, in a report called “Above-sized Industrial Enterprises Information of Shizong County” issued on July 31, 2013 by Department of Industry and Information Technology of Shizong County, DaPuAn Mine is a subsidiary of Shizong HunTai Coal Mining Co, Ltd and its profit in 2012 was only 4.9 million RMB. The total profit of the first seven months of 2013 was only 419,000 RMB.

Coal Mine Operational Status Contradicts to Financial Report

Apart from the coal mine ownership, inconsistencies are also found in the coal mine operational status.

It is suggested in 10-K that the total revenue of L&L Energy in fiscal 2013 (From April 30, 2012 to April 30, 2013) amounted to $198 million, within which the total revenue of above-mentioned five coal mines was $75.6896 million. Of the overall 669,500 tons of coal sale, 228,000 tons went to DaPuAn Mine, 131,700 tons to Shuchong Mine and 142,900 tons to Weishe Mine. The output of Luozhou Mine which was purchased on November 18, 1012 was 9.33 tons while the output of LaShu Coal mine was 7.32 tons.

An enquiry on local authority by NBD reporters in October suggested that among 31 coal mines in this county, only 7 mines are still in operation and 13 mines have been called an abort to under policy-related consideration, among which most have an annual production capacity of 90 thousand or 150 thousand. During an on-site investigation on Weishe Mine, a local driver told the reporter coal conveyors were barely seen along this road in recent years and that allowed the road remain in good condition.

Mr. Cai, who became the mine director of Weishe Mine in 2008 and began his work in Union Energy in September 2013, told reporters that under the influence of policy, the project acceptance of Weishe Mine was not completed until this August, before which, the coal output was only 1000 tons per month, with a total number of only 20 thousand because for most time of the year the mine was in the state of idling.

Reporters also conducted an investigation on Luozhou Mine. However, reporters failed to see any coal conveyor along the road to the Mine. Besides, after a landslide near the mine, an emergency road that is not accessible for large coal conveyors is the only passageway to the Mine. The factory seems very quiet and machines are idled.

Mr. Qing, Head of Logistics Department of Luozhou Mine told reporters although Luozhou Mine possesses the operation qualification, the production was halted in September and most workers have left the mine. But Mr. Qing didn’t have anything about the specific reason for production halt.

A responsible person of LaShu Mine named Zhi Zhang told reporter that as a coalmine is still under construction, Lashu Coal mine didn’t start its production until November 2013. Till the beginning of October 2013, the total output was 100 thousand tons, with the daily output of 600 tons. Since the engineering coal is not of high quality, despite the good sales in the market, the sale price is much lower than other coal, being 200-400 yuan per ton.

Mr. Zhang also said that “it is impossible to gain profit because the investment is too high.” It is true that a minimum of 300-500 million RMB is needed in the construction and extension of a coal mine. It is also confirmed by Mr. Liu, the manager from L&L Energy that according to the governmental policy, technical improvement is a must in a 300-thousand-ton coal mine and above. Technical improvement means production halts. And the production scheme must be revised and equipment be renewed after the technical improvement. As for the money invested in the technical improvement, Mr. Liu said it was in accordance with the holding proportion, which means L&L Energy is the major investor.

The Trade Amount Needs Verification

In the recent years’ downturn of the coal industry, many small and medium-sized coalmines had to halt production or decrease production output due to the consolidation within the whole industry.  Their expenditures exceed their income.

Under such conditions, however, according the 10-K report released by L&L Energy, the Company boasted a $45.6628 million revenue derived from the wholesale and distribution of coal during the fiscal year of 2013 and a coal sale of 331,600 tons. It is known by NBD reporters that the leading distribution platform of L&L Energy is Guizhou Daxin L&L Mining Co. Ltd, (hereafter referred to as Daxin L&L.)

In May, 2013, L&L Energy released news through PR Newswire, announcing that the company has signed a 10-month sales contract with Datang International Power Generation Co., Ltd. (“Datang Utility”) to provide thermal coal for its Guangxi HeShan power plant. Last November, L&L Energy renewed its contract with Datang Utility and elevated the coal supply to one million tons per year. From January2013, L&L began to send coal to Datang Utility

If the above-mentioned statements are authentic, then it means nearly all the distribution business of fiscal 2013 must come from the trade contract with Guangxi HeShan power plant. In order to verify this information, NBD reporters conducted an interview with Zhi Xie, the vice manager of Daxin L&L, who made an affirmative disclosure that although Guangxi HeShan power plant is the major client of Daxin L&L, the company has other clients in provinces like Sichuan. During the interview, the staff from Daxin L&L deliberately put a large pile of original sales records from the recent period in a conspicuous place and initiatively presented to our reporter.

However, according to the reporter’s findings, Guangxi HeShan power plant belongs to Datang Guiguan Heshan Power Generation Co. Ltd (hereafter referred to as HeShan Company), a subsidiary of Guangxi Guiguan Electric Power Co Ltd (Guiguan Power). In a related-transaction report published by Guiguan Power last April, it was announced that HeShan Company signed a contract with Datang Electric Power Fuel Co., Ltd (Datang Power), an indirectly held subsidiary of China Datang Corporation (CDT), to purchase 500 thousand tons of thermal coal. The trading amount reached the maximum annual trading volume of 350 million RMB. The thermal coal purchased in this contract occupied 17% of the total expected thermal coal consumption of the whole year.

It is also emphasized in the announcement issued by Guiguan Power that due to high sulfur and low heat value of local coal, the company had no other choice but to add water-shipped coal which has low sulfur and high heat value so as to reduce the fuel cost as well as to meet the discharge standards. It is shown on the official website of State Grid that HeShan Company made 21 adjustments to the thermal coal purchase price and regulations in 2012. In addition, 1.5 million tons of local coal and Guizhou high sulfur coal was admixed during the whole year, with the admix ratio being more than 50% and as much as 60 million RMB fuel cost saved.

From the foregoing information, it can be inferred that the annual one-million-ton coal supply of Daxin L&L takes up 34% of the annual coal consumption of HeShan Company, which means, according to the admixture ratio, that the supply amount of Daxin L&L takes up more than 50% of high sulfur coal consumption. For thermal power plants, who seizes the initiative in fuel gets the upper hand in the “cost reduction and benefits increase” plan. Furthermore, HeShan power plant puts great emphasis on its independence from the suppliers during its cooperation with Datang Power. Then, how Daxin L&L get such a big order becomes another mystery.

Yun Zhang, the Chairman Secretary of Guiguan Power told NBD reporter yesterday that he didn’t know the above-mentioned trade between HeShan and Daxin L&L and that he need to verify this information. But reporters got no reply at the press time.

Former U.S. Politicians Served as L&L Energy Board Directors?

In an attempt to unravel the delicate and complicated trade mystery between L&L energy and Union Energy, NBD reporters made phone calls to Union Energy, expecting to get more information about its connection with L&L Energy. After several failed attempts, the call was answered, but the person claimed to be the agency personnel of industry and commerce. Moreover, during an on-site investigation before, our reporter was declined with the excuse that “our director is not in the office”.

The name Dickson Lee was constantly seen in the series of coal trading and coal mine operations. This person is actually the former chairman and CEO of L&L Energy. It is known that L&L Energy uses another name “U.S Liwei Energy Company” to facilitate its operation in China.

From the official website of the State Administration of Industry and Commerce of Yunnan province, it was also found by NBD reporters that Dickson Lee was the responsible person of several companies that was founded successively during November 2010 to April 2013, including Yunnan L&L Taifung Mining Co., Ltd, the Kunming Branch Office of Yunnan L&L Taifung Mining Co., Ltd, the Kunming Branch Office of Guizhou LeeV Mining Co., Ltd.

Dickson Lee once publicly expressed his anticipation to broaden Atlantic energy maps by combining the existing Guizhou and Yunan mining resources with U.S. clean energy methods and the ability to process pollutants. Guizhou province is regarded as the base in broadening L&L Energy’s global energy map.

An investor from Taiwan, China, who claimed to have contact with Dickson Lee and his company, told the reporter that Lee started his career as an accountant. Therefore he is exceedingly familiar with accounting process. He is also very smart, sophisticated as well as generous to the investors.

On November 16, 2013, Dickson Lee paid a visit to The Institute of Coal Chemistry (ICC) affiliated with the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS) and gave a report on the topic of “the Collaborative Projects between ICC and U.S. Shale Gas”.  According to the news released by ICC, Dickson Lee holds a CPA license and once served as the judge for the insider trading of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China, dealing with the lawsuit cases of the cheating committed in the listed Hong Kong companies.

The names of many former U.S high officials and politicians are seen in the list of L&L Energy’s high-level executives. Some of them are Clayton Fong, Deputy Assistant for Public Liaison 1992-1993 & Deputy Associate Director of Presidential Personnel; Norman Y. Mineta, Vice Board of Director, formerly served in President George W. Bush‘s Cabinet as the United States Secretary of Transportation and also served as President Bill Clinton‘s Secretary of Commerce; Edmund Moy, the consultant and former board member, served in the George W. Bush administration as Special Assistant to the President for Presidential Personnel and the 38th Director of the United States Mint.

Many of its high-level executives have close connections with China. For example, Joe Borich, Independent Board Chairman of L&L Energy, has closely involved in China as early as when he served the US President of Richard Nixon. He was formerly American Consul General at Shanghai of Peoples’ Republic of China from 1994 to 1997.

L&L Was Shorted by A Research Institute in The U.S.

In September, 2013, L&L Energy was shorted by a research institute in the United States. In the whistleblower report released by this institute, GeoInvesting, it claimed that that L&L’s numerous acquisitions and divestitures in the last few years have amounted to a “bait and switch shell game.” L&L exercised control over a large amount of assets through a series of swapping trades that actually have never taken place and also through the exchange of assets that it has never owned.

Instead of initially refuting the central allegation after being shorted, L&L tried every method to boost the stock price by increasing shares held by senior executives, replacing wages with stock options, hiring consultants, and issuing an evaluation report.

L&L claimed, after being shorted on September 19, 2013, that they immediately formed an independent investigation committee. On October 2, L&L hired Wuqing Wang, partner of Weiming Fund Management Company, Ltd, as the Company’s strategic consultant in the Clean Energy Program. According to the public document, the major business of Wang’s company includes Modern Agriculture Fund, Read Estate Fund, Private Equity and financial consultation.

Dickson Lee made no clarification or any response after the short seller report was released. NBD reporters tried to contact his personal assistant but got no reply.

On October 10, 2013, L&L’ published a report made by SEE [SeeThruEquity], an independent asset investigation company, claiming that their stock price was undervalued and they were filing for a declaration of its assets. Five days later, L&L announced its cooperation with Wanyuan Environment Protection Group which is mainly engaged in sewage treatment.

Despite the fact that L&L Energy did publish a report to refute Geo’s allegations, the NASDAQ stock exchange halted trading in L&L Energy shares on November 18, 2013 because it failed to provide the “extra information” requested by NASDAQ.

On November 27, 2013,Mohan Datwani tendered his resignation from his position as the chairman of both the Audit and Special Independent Committees of L&L, claiming “the company didn’t keep me informed on the degree and extent of ongoing government and regulatory investigations. Second … did not provided adequate financial support to complete the committee’s work, especially in connection with hiring independent, qualified forensic accountant.”

L&L Energy “respectfully disagrees” with Datwani and notes that no other board members have “expressed dissatisfaction with the Company’s disclosures.” As to the second concern, it states that “none of the current board members agree with Mr. Datwani’s opinion” and that “no funding requests have been denied by the company.

After SEC and the American Ministry of Justice filed a lawsuit against Dickson Lee, this international financial mystery is being disclosed.

List of findings on the NBD reporters’ investigations:

  1. The shares of Weishe Mine is currently held by two natural persons. With an annual output of merely 20 thousand tons, only a limited amount of engineering coal was produced before August, 2013.
  2. The shares of Luozhou Mine is currently held by three natural persons. The Mine was idled in 2013.
  3. Guo Yingquan is the sole investor of the Lasu Mine, which didn’t start its production until November, 2013.
  4. Customers of DaXin L&L are very limited. Therefore the alleged trading amount is doubtful.
  5. Hong Xing Coal Washing Facility was shut down two years ago. Therefore, based on verification from tax authorities, the claimed profit could be falsified. Notably, L&L Taifung Mining Co., Ltd was once cited for a violation by the local government. According to the document provided by the Department of Industry and Information Technology of Shizong County, the DaPuAn Mine is a subsidiary of HunTai Mining Co, Ltd, with a 4.9 million RMB profit in 2012 and 419,000 RMB profit from January to July of 2013. Serious capital shortage is hitting this company.

L&L Energy’s Chinese Executive: The Charge against Dickson Lee Is Unrelated to Our Company

It was announced in a report issued by L&L Energy, Inc. (“L&L Energy” or the “Company”) on April 14 that L&L Energy was ready to be voluntarily delisted from NASDAQ. In the meantime, Dickson Lee, the founder of L&L Energy has already resigned from the positions of both Board Chairman & CEO and was sued in the United States.

Yesterday (April 17), the NBD reporter made another phone call to Jianling Cao, the vice manager of Kunming office of Yunnan L&L Taifung Mining Co., Ltd. (hereafter referred to as L&L Taifung), an L&L Energy subsidiary in Yunnan Province. She confirmed the delisting of L&L Energy and declared that the charge against Dickson Lee “is a personal matter that has nothing to do with the Company.” Cao also told the reporter that Kunming office of L&L Taifung had already been moved to Qujing City in Yunnan Province and was in normal operation. However “the company is going through transformation and there’s not much business in the coal industry.”

On October 22, 2013, a NBD reporter paid the first visit to the Kunming office of L&L Energy but the interview request was refused by a front-desk clerk. However, shortly after the reporter left the office, a self-proclaimed vice manager of Kunming office of Yunnan L&L Taifung made a phone call to the reporter with whom she hoped to arrange an appointment.  This person was Jianling Cao.

Notably, on the official website of L&L Energy, Jianling Cao is described as “possessing more than 30 years’ experience in the operation, rules, shipment and credit trading of international trade.” As one of L&L Energy’s executives in China who boasts an overseas background, Ms. Cao was once the general manager of an energy company in Australia.

October 23, 2013, the NBD reporter arranged a meeting with Cao in a café in Kunming. During the conversation, she told the reporter that L&L Energy would initiate legal proceedings in the Chinese court against GeoInvesting for committing libel and would, in the meantime, provide a point-by-point rebuttal to all the allegations made by GeoInvesting, which was to be presented to NASDAQ. Nevertheless, many contradictions were found between this conversation and the announcement previously published by L&L Energy.

Yesterday, when NBD reporters tried to re-confirm the information released by L&L Energy, Cao said that the Company actually didn’t initiate any legal proceedings.

Listed below is the conversation between the NBD reporter (hereafter abbreviated as NBD) and Jianling Cao on October 23, 2013.

“Geo is playing hard.”

NBD: What is L&L Energy’s attitude towards the shorting report released by Geo?

Jianling Cao: Many so called “facts” uncovered by Geo are actually not real. They are putting us on the spot by uncovering information that is unverified with us. The self-alleged investigators from Geo never show up and the license plate of the car driven by the investigators is also problematic. Another abnormal phenomenon is that the legal person of Seekingalpha, the website that helped Geo to publish the short seller report has as many as ten used names.  They are playing hard, just like flies looking for the opening. After the short seller report was released, the stock price fell dramatically and the stockholders are being cheated. They are putting us in great jeopardy.”

NBD: Is that Geo has reached out to L&L Energy?

Jianling Cao: Yes, it does. It has made contact with our headquarter in the U.S. And back in China, we will file a lawsuit against Geo for defamation and at the same time, will submit documents to NASDAQ to refute all the accusations made by Geo. As a matter of fact, I have reviewed all the evidence provided by Geo and I have to admit that they are very superficial. They have no idea about China and about Chinese policies.

NBD: To which step of the lawsuit proceeding?

Jianling Cao: Lawyers are currently arranging documents and we’ll let all the materials to be submitted to the court go public because we are not afraid of them. But now it is really not convenient to disclose specific information since we are in the middle of collecting and submitting materials. You’ll also soon know the attitude of NASDAQ towards L&L Energy. And we hired independent board chairman for this incident. You see, this event has largely increased our workload.

NBD: Why does the public fail to receive any response from Mr. Lee, the board chairman?

Jianling Cao: As an enterprise, we need to move forward and have new development because the golden age of coal mining is no longer with us, both in U.S and China. Therefore Mr. Lee needs to put more time and efforts in the market expansion and business extension, especially in green and clean energy. We need to make a prudent and circumspect response instead of a simple one, which means that we need to collect more information, as detailed as possible and get approval by the board. And my own personal response can’t represent the attitude of the whole company either. So please wait for the complete and comprehensive response made by the Company.

“It’s not as simple as ‘1+1=2’”

NBD: Are many of Geo’s accusations related to the coalmines’ ownership?

Jianling Cao: In reality, many investors of coal mines in China choose not to be the real legal person of their own company because of many unexpected hazardous situations like gas explosion. So what these companies do, including DaPuAn Mine, is to hire a legal person when they need to avoid any risk. In this case, the hired legal person is not the real owner of the coal mine. Self-owned companies have a very complicated transfer system that involves many documents and assessments. So they have to pursue other ways of cooperation. Take DaPuAn Mine for instance, Mr. Laozhong Yang is the legal person, but there is a contract for it in which the percentage of the shares held by him is stipulated. Therefore, the thing is not as simple as ‘1+1=2’, especially for the coal mining enterprises. There are a lot of things that cannot be explained in one word or two. We’ll have them fully explained in the documents to be handed in to NASDAQ.

NBD: When was Hong Xing Coal Washing Facility shut down? Who was the legal person? Still Liu Bin?

Jianling Cao:Hong Xing Coal Washing Facility was idled this year (2013) but we will soon re-open it. Its technique is quite backwards so we will renew the facility after experts’ assessment one or two days later. It’s expected to be re-opened this year. The pro forma legal person of Hong Xing is Liu Bin. We have notarization, we have his finger print on it, we have the authorization and we have the testimony from the lawyer.

“That might be a mistake in translation”

NBD: Hong Xing did not pay tax since 2012?

Jianling Cao: We’ll have it clarified in the lawsuit.

NBD: Is that true that in the statement published by L&L Energy a coal washing facility was mentioned?

Jianling Cao: No, it is not true. That coal washing facility belongs to L&L Taifung and we authorized them to work for us. That’s normal.

NBD: Then is there anything to do with HunTai?

Jianling Cao: HunTai is owned by Laozhong Yang and we have business cooperation with this company. We’ll submit the agreement to the judicial authority, which actually had gone public on-line to the shareholders.

NBD: Does TaiFung have coal washing facilities?

Jianling Cao: We haven’t mentioned it before. In terms of the sale revenue, Hong Xing occupies 20% and TaiFung 19%.

NBD: But it was indeed mentioned in the statement that “the coal washing business goes to Hong Xing and TaiFung.”

Jianling Cao: That might be a mistake in the translation. TaiFung is a trade company and the sales proportion does not take up as much as 19%. I need to further verify the details.

NBD: L&L TaiFung has been idled for quite a long time.

Jianling Cao: L&L TaiFung is a trade company and it’s not mainly engaged in coal washing and coal mining.  Due to many of their entrusted businesses, the workplace of L&L TaiFung and HunTai has become one. But the focus of L&L TaiFung in the future years will be put on Qujing City of Yunnan province, including many counties like Shizong and Luoping.

NBD: Actually we have made attempts to contact your company and even made phone calls to the Beijing Office, but a Ms. Zhang told us she didn’t know anything about the incident.

Jianling Cao: After the incident occurred, everyone was assigned to different tasks. So chances are that this Ms. Zhang was really not clear about the things you asked and she couldn’t give you any answers.

The original article found on National Business Daily’s website is shown below.

—————————————————————-

龙腾矿业洗煤业务疑云:近5亿营收æ¥æºä¸æ˜Ž

http://www.nbd.com.cn 2014-04-18 01:14

核心提示: 4月14日,龙腾矿业宣布即将退市,其创始人æŽç»´æ¾ˆå·²è¾žåŽ»CEO兼董事长职务,并在美国遭到双重起诉,指控内容包括涉嫌欺诈、虚假陈述、伪造签名等。

龙腾矿业洗煤业务疑云:近5亿营收æ¥æºä¸æ˜Ž

每经记者 江然 岳琦 发自成都、贵阳、昆明、毕节

4月14日,龙腾矿业(LLEN)发公告宣布即将退市,其创始人æŽç»´æ¾ˆå·²è¾žåŽ»CEO兼董事长职务,并在美国遭到双重起诉,指控内容包括涉嫌欺诈、虚 假陈述、伪造签名等,此事引发资本界高度关注。昨日(4月17日),《每日经济新闻》记者致电龙腾矿业在华高管曹建灵女士,她亦证实了此事,并称æŽè¢«æŒ‡æŽ§ 已与公司无关,退市后,公司会正常运作。

事实上,早在2013å¹´10月,记者就兵分两路,前往龙腾矿业在华业务主要区域云南、贵州两省展开调查,发现公司在2013年财报所述的报告期内, 有接近5亿元的巨é¢è¥æ”¶æ¥è·¯ä¸æ¸…,利润子虚乌有,旗下矿æƒå½’属疑云丛生。龙腾矿业究竟是一家怎样的公司?操盘手æŽç»´æ¾ˆæ˜¯ä½•è®¸äººï¼Ÿä»–究竟在哪方é¢æ¶‰å«Œæ¬ºè¯ˆï¼Ÿ

早在2013年7月底,龙腾矿业向美国证券交易委员会 (SEC)提交10-k财报(以下简称10-k),宣称其中国洗煤业务在2012年5月到2013年4月期间产生营业收入7760万美元(约合人民币 4.8亿元),占其财年总收入的39%,创造利润820万美元(约合人民币5000万元)。

其财报称,作为龙腾矿业该财年最大的收入æ¥æºï¼Œæ´—煤业务主要运营平台为其子公司云南利维泰丰煤业有限公司(以下简称利维泰丰),利维泰丰旗下拥有红星选煤厂。而蹊跷的是,在其10-k发布后不足一月,龙腾矿业突然宣布出售红星选煤厂。

经过实地调查,《每日经济新闻》记者发现,红星选煤厂早在2013年以前就已停产。当地税收部门提供的文件显示,红星选煤厂在2012年实际收入寥寥无几,2012年6月以后就再未发生任何应税行为。

虽然龙腾矿业称旗下还有一处名为泰丰的选煤厂,但记者从多个核心消息源证实,该选煤厂并不存在,而是叫恒泰选煤厂,其归属也另有其人,而恒泰选煤厂的实际收入也不足支撑龙腾矿业财报所称的巨é¢æ”¶å…¥ï¼Œå…¶æ´—煤业务近5亿元营收æ¥æºä¸æ˜Žã€‚

在对利维泰丰管理人员及财务人员的采访求证中,其收入æ¥æºä¾ç„¶ä¸èƒ½è¢«è¯å®žï¼Œå¾ˆå¤šè¯´æ³•ç”šè‡³ä¸Žé¾™è…¾çŸ¿ä¸šå‘布的消息自相矛盾。截至记者调查结æŸï¼Œé¾™è…¾çŸ¿ä¸šç¾Žå›½æ–¹é¢åŠä¸­å›½åŒ—京总部å‡ä»¥è¿›å…¥å¸æ³•ç¨‹åºä¸ºç”±ï¼Œæœªå¯¹è®°è€…的采访要求作出回应。

盈利洗煤厂被叫卖

龙腾矿业也称美国利维能源公司,是美国纳斯达克上市企业。虽然其业务都在中国,但与大多数中概股不同,公司创始人、董事长及大股东æŽç»´æ¾ˆï¼ˆDicksonLee)为美籍华人,公司总部也位于美国。

对于做空机构的指责,利维泰丰昆明分公司副经理曹建灵对《每日经济新闻》记者回应称,龙腾矿业 æ‹Ÿ 对 发 出 做 空 报 å‘Š çš„GeoInvesting(以下简称Geo)和SeekingAlpha以卖空为目的,在网上散布不实报道进行法律诉讼并拟将有关文件呈交有关机构。但 对于洗煤厂营收等方é¢æ ¸å¿ƒé—®é¢˜ï¼Œæ›¹å»ºçµç§°ï¼Œæœ‰å…³è¯¥æ´—煤厂的文件为法律凭据不方便向记者提供。

2013年7月底,龙腾矿业的10-k称,该企业前身是一家成立于1999年的美国内华达州公司,经过一系列并购后,于2010年在美国纳斯达克上市(NASDAQ:LLEN),目前主要在中国云南、贵州从事与煤炭相关的业务。

“我们有5处煤矿,两处洗煤厂,三处煤炭批发分销网络。中国总部设于北京,贵阳、昆明、台北也有工作点。”《每日经济新闻》记者在10-k财报中看到。

2013财年(2012å¹´5月到2013å¹´4月),龙腾矿业收入总é¢ä¸º1.9898亿美元,总成本为1.3742亿美元,毛利润6156万美元,是 2012财年的两倍。这里é¢ï¼Œæ´—煤收入贡献了7763万美元(约合人民币4.8亿元),占总收入的39%。洗煤净利润为819万美元(约合人民币5000 万元)。

整个2013财年,龙腾矿业一共产煤76.3万吨,洗煤47万吨,分销33.1万吨。对于洗煤业务的盈利表现,10-k概述为“少量增加”,2012财年龙腾矿业洗煤量为43.4万吨,2013财年为47.4吨,较上一财年增加了不到10%。

对于洗煤业务的介绍,10-k明确表述 “龙腾矿业只有两处洗煤厂,年洗煤量共计约48万吨。红星选煤厂为第三方洗煤(如:éžé¾™è…¾çŸ¿ä¸šä¸‹å±žæœºæž„),大普安的洗煤设备只为大普安煤矿服务。” (P21)10-k同时还指出,正因为此,大普安这部分洗煤业务已被纳入该煤矿销售的总体服务,并不单独计算。也就是说,2013财年对龙腾矿业洗煤业务 做出贡献的仅剩只为第三方洗煤的红星选煤厂。

在中国煤炭行业下滑背景下,洗煤业务为龙腾矿业2013财年带æ¥æŽ¥è¿‘820万美元的净利润,红星选煤厂贡献不容忽视。然而,2013å¹´8月19日龙 腾矿业官网却毫无先兆地发布了一则处理红星选煤厂的公告。公告称“长远看æ¥ï¼Œçº¢æ˜Ÿé€‰ç…¤åŽ‚对企业已不具备可增值性,管理层已停止红星选煤厂业务,将尽快卖给 感兴趣的买家。”

无风不起浪,这则普通公告引发一系列质疑。美国研究机构Geo于2013年9月19日发布做空报告,指出红星选煤厂早在2012年就已停产,龙腾矿业涉嫌财务造假、欺诈投资者,龙腾矿业股价应声下跌至每股1.27美元,跌幅达38.65%。

2013å¹´9月27日,《每日经济新闻》记者获取龙腾矿业北京总部发言人张女士电è¯ï¼Œä½†å¼ å¥³å£«åœ¨ç”µè¯ä¸­å‘Šè¯‰è®°è€…,该事件已经进入司法程序,但她表示“只能说这么多”。

多方证实早已关闭

龙腾矿业为何突然关闭占其年收入近4成的红星选煤厂?该厂2013财年究竟是怎样的经营情况?为何龙腾矿业迟迟不对备受质疑的洗煤业务做出回应?其财务数据又是否真实可信?

红星选煤厂位于云南省师宗县雄壁镇瓦鲁æ‘,è·ç¦»å¸ˆå®—县城区20余公里,紧挨滥泥沟煤矿,由煤矿所有人æŽçº¢æ˜ŸäºŽ2004年出资建造。进出这里的公路大é¢ç§¯è¢«é‡åž‹å¡è½¦åŽ‹åï¼Œç§¯æ°´æ— æ³•æŽ’出,下雨天道路泥泞不堪。

2013å¹´10月19日,《每日经济新闻》记者在瓦鲁æ‘境内é è¿‘大舍æ‘的一处å¡å¤´æ‰¾åˆ°äº†çº¢æ˜Ÿé€‰ç…¤åŽ‚。厂内洗煤设备并未运转,废弃在一处空地,无人看管,厂房破旧不堪,部分墙体倒塌,看不出任何生产的迹象。

沿路æœæ´—煤厂下方走去是滥泥沟煤矿,洗煤厂旁边几十米处就是办公楼,门口竖瀓师宗县红星选煤厂”“师宗县滥泥沟煤矿”两å—白色牌子,字迹斑驳。

“这里早就没有生产了,一年多以前就已停产,”在滥泥沟煤矿工作了23å¹´çš„æŽå…ˆç”Ÿå½“时告诉记者,“自从私庄煤矿出大事(煤矿事故)后就没有煤可以洗了。”

公开报道显示,2011å¹´11月10日,云南省曲é–市师宗县私庄煤矿发生特别重大煤与瓦斯突出事故,造成43人死亡,直接经济损失3970万元。此后很长一段时间师宗县人“谈私庄色变”,煤矿进入整顿期,洗煤厂没了生意,关掉大半。

红星选煤厂最早的主人æŽçº¢æ˜Ÿå‘Šè¯‰è®°è€…,虽然该厂已于2009年转让给了师宗县福胜商贸公司(以下简称福胜公司)老æ¿é©¬çŽ‰ç¦ï¼Œä½†æ»¥æ³¥æ²Ÿç…¤çŸ¿ä¾ç„¶å±žäºŽ 他,且仍在正常生产,所以他几乎每天都要æ¥ç…¤çŸ¿ç›¯ç€ï¼Œ“滥泥沟煤矿的人每天上班都会经过(红星选煤厂),没看到它动过,”æŽçº¢æ˜Ÿè¯´ï¼Œ“准确时间实在想不 起,大概2012年就停了。”

红星选煤厂附件有两排门窗紧闭的平房。æŽçº¢æ˜Ÿç§°è¿™äº›ä»¥å‰éƒ½æ˜¯çº¢æ˜Ÿé€‰ç…¤åŽ‚的办公室,后æ¥å˜ä¸ºçœ‹åŽ‚人的住所,“看厂的人换了一拨又一拨,”æŽçº¢æ˜Ÿæ‘‡ç€å¤´è¯´ï¼Œ“肯定什么都不知道。”瓦鲁æ‘委会值班人员称红星选煤厂“已经两年没洗煤了”。

记者随后在福胜公司办公室找到了红星选煤厂第二任所有人马玉福。据他介绍,2008年底至2009å¹´åˆè¿™æ®µæ—¶é—´ï¼Œä»–从æŽçº¢æ˜Ÿæ‰‹ä¸­ä¹°ä¸‹çº¢æ˜Ÿé€‰ç…¤åŽ‚,随 后亲戚æ¨è€å¿ åˆä¼™å…¥è‚¡ï¼Œä½†å› ä¸ºç»è¥ç†å¿µä¸åŒï¼Œä¸¤äººäºŽ2011å¹´“分道扬镳”,当年12月马玉福把红星选煤厂转让给了æ¨è€å¿ ã€‚“转让后没多久洗煤厂就停产 了,”马玉福告诉记者。

师宗县工信局负责人向记者出示了一本名为 《师宗县规模以上工业企业信息资料》的内部文件,该文件由师宗县煤炭局上报给工信局,上报时间为2013å¹´7月31日。文件提到红星选煤厂2012年总产 值8677万元,利润756万元,上交税金347万元。工信局对其描述为“本企业属于恒泰矿业,企业内部整合目前已停产。”2013年目标任务也没有填 写,“因为该厂2012年就停产了,所以没有为其制定2013年的任务”,该负责人向记者解释。

经过数次å°è¯•ï¼Œè®°è€…也未能打通æ¨è€å¿ ç”µè¯ï¼Œå‘˜å·¥ç§°ä»–“在昆明办事,找不到人”;师宗县当地主管工业的官员亦未能联系到æ¨è€å¿ æœ¬äººã€‚据马玉福透露,æ¨è€å¿ æœ‰å¤šä¸ªæ‰‹æœºå·ç ï¼Œå¾ˆéš¾æ‰¾åˆ°å…¶æœ¬äººï¼Œ“但只要他想找你,很快就能找到。”马玉福的说法再添了一ä¸ç¥žç§˜ã€‚

利润被指子虚乌有

同样指向红星选煤厂2012年经营惨淡的证据,还有该洗煤厂2012年的纳税情况。2013å¹´10月21日,《每日经济新闻》记者æ¥åˆ°å¸ˆå®—县地税局第二分局,该分局局长æŽå®½ç”Ÿä¸ºè®°è€…提供了一份红星选煤厂2012年全年纳税资料。

记者看到,从2012å¹´1月到6月,红星选煤厂仅向当地地税局缴纳31539元税款,6月后再没有发生应税行为。这三万元税款也被Geo的做空报告提及,龙腾矿业当时回应称“Geo错误地理解了中国税收制度,地税局仅征收一些附加税费”。

æŽå®½ç”Ÿå¯¹æ­¤åšå‡ºäº†è§£é‡Šã€‚他表示,地税的征收ä¾æ®æ˜¯å›½ç¨Žï¼Œçº¢æ˜Ÿé€‰ç…¤åŽ‚向师宗县国税局缴纳17%的增值税,而地税则在增值税é¢çš„基础上征收6%的附加税 费,这其中包括1%的增值税城建税、2%的增值税地方教育附加费,以及3%的地方教育附加税,共计6%的附加税亦被称作“税中税”。

“2012年红星选煤厂是停产状态,一直没有生产,没有经营收入,不产生税收,”æŽå®½ç”Ÿå‘Šè¯‰è®°è€…,“地税这一å—,红星选煤厂直接向二分局缴纳”,虽 然红星选煤厂已停产,但并未申请注销,其相对的纳税义务也未终止,2012å¹´6月以后该厂ä¾ç„¶æ¯æœˆç”³æŠ¥ï¼Œä½†å› æ²¡æœ‰å‘生相应的应税行为,所以未缴纳税款,所 è°““零申报”。也即是说,红星选煤厂2012年全年地税缴税共计31539元。

从二分局提供的数据看,红星选煤厂在2012å¹´4月、5月各自缴纳了14642元、11922元增值税附加税费,剩下的是约5000元的印花税、车 船税等。“红星选煤厂向国税局缴纳的17%增值税,是按照销售é¢è®¡å¾çš„,它实际缴纳é¢æ˜¯æ‰£é™¤å¢žå€¼ç¨Žè¿›é¡¹ç¨Žé¢åŽçš„æ•°é¢ã€‚”财务专家马é–昊分析说,“根据目前 已知æ¡ä»¶ï¼Œè™½æ— æ³•å€’推出该厂2012年收入的具体数é¢ï¼Œä½†å¯æŽ¨æ–­è¯¥åŽ‚营业收入ç»å¤§éƒ¨åˆ†æ˜¯è™šæž„,当然,其利润也是子虚乌有,”马é–昊说。

与此同时,师宗县国税局局长王石东的回应也说明了红星选煤厂的经营情况并不理想。如果红星选煤厂真如年报所述经营收入高达7760万美元,折合人民币约4.8亿元,必定是当地纳税大户,但当地多个工业、税务部门负责人对这样一个选煤企业却并无印象。

事实上,王石东对红星选煤厂有一点印象,“去年红星选煤厂欠税未缴,我们催缴过一次,当时需要我签字,所以我对这个洗煤厂有点印象。”王局长告诉记者。而在师宗县发布的地方税务局2013å¹´4月限期改正公告中,红星选煤厂被指未按期申报应纳税款。

“按照现行的增值税æ¡ä¾‹ï¼Œè¿™ç±»ä¼ä¸šæ²¡æœ‰å…·ä½“的优惠政策,但对于所得税而言,可能会享受‘三免三减半’政策。”马é–昊表示,“因此,如果其报表数据属实,也与所交的税é¢çŸ›ç›¾ã€‚”

此外,记者从10-k公布的组织结构图(P7)看到,龙腾矿业通过数个全资子公司以及ç»å¯¹æŽ§è‚¡çš„公司操作中国业务。云南利维泰丰煤业有限公司(下称利维泰丰)就是其中一个。

公开消息显示,利维泰丰为中美合资企业,注册于2011å¹´12月,注册地点是云南省曲é–市,法人代表为龙腾矿业董事长æŽç»´æ¾ˆï¼Œä¸­æ–¹åˆèµ„人正是此前提到的æ¨è€å¿ ã€‚10-k显示,龙腾矿业持有利维泰丰98%çš„è‚¡æƒï¼Œçº¢æ˜Ÿé€‰ç…¤åŽ‚是利维泰丰旗下公司。

但红星选煤厂的归属问题也受到质疑。从工商信息看,红星选煤厂为私营企业,法人代表为师宗县当地人刘彬。对此,利维泰丰昆明分公司副经理曹建灵回应 称,因现行政策等一系列原因,洗煤厂难以转入龙腾矿业名下,所以实行委托方法。“红星的行使法人代表叫刘彬。我们委托他作法人代表,也有他的按章,我们的 授æƒï¼Œä»¥åŠå¾‹å¸ˆçš„公证。”曹建灵告诉记者。

洗煤业务疑云四起

2013å¹´10月7日,龙腾矿业在其官网上对有关洗煤业务的质疑首次作出回应,改口称“该企业旗下有两处洗煤厂,红星以及泰丰”。回应表 示,2013财年的洗煤收入中,红星选煤厂只占公司总销量的20%,泰丰则占19%。并再次重申 “公司于今年夏天闲置红星选煤厂”,“红星选煤厂于2013å¹´6月30日停产,7月未产生任何收入。”

横空出世的“泰丰洗煤厂”是否真的存在?与利维泰丰又是什么关系?龙腾矿业的洗煤业务一时间疑云四起。

在调查过程中,马玉福是首个向记者提到“利维泰丰还有一个洗煤厂”的人。“红星选煤厂设备的零件被他们(æ¨è€å¿ ï¼‰æ‹†ä¸‹é‡ç½®åˆ°å¦ä¸€å¤„洗煤厂,”马玉福告诉记者,“这点我也不太认同,毕竟当时装备红星花费也很多。”

马玉福随后向记者提供了该洗煤厂地å€ï¼Œè€Œè¿™ä¸ªåœ°å€åˆšå¥½ä¸Žå¸ˆå®—县招商局副局长æœå·žå®æä¾›çš„利维泰丰公司的地å€ä¸ºåŒä¸€å¤„,都是“师宗县矣腊工业园区,昆钢焦化厂旁。”记者按图索骥,出现在眼前的却是一处名叫 “师宗恒泰矿业有限公司选煤厂”(以下简称恒泰选煤厂)的工厂。

2013å¹´10月20日上午,记者以了解当地煤炭行业招商引资为由,与恒泰选煤厂厂长æ¨æ ‘林见é¢ã€‚对于龙腾矿业持有恒泰矿业80%è‚¡æƒçš„说法,æ¨æ ‘ 林称,他与投资人æ¨è€å¿ æ˜¯å…„弟关系,恒泰选煤厂于2012å¹´6月才建立,为自然人独资,出资人为æ¨è€å¿ ï¼Œè€Œåˆ©ç»´æ³°ä¸°åˆ™æ˜¯ä¸­ç¾Žåˆèµ„。

据æ¨æ ‘林称,利维泰丰只有一个洗煤厂,即早已不再生产的红星选煤厂。æ¨æ ‘林表示,行情不好加上2011年底私庄煤矿出事,当地的洗煤厂陆续关门,红 星选煤厂也在2012å¹´6月停产。“红星选煤厂已经停了1年,”æ¨æ ‘林当时告诉《每日经济新闻》记者,“目前县上就两家洗煤厂,一个是恒泰,一个叫明科 (音)。”后者为一名四å·è€æ¿æŠ•èµ„,与他们无关。

据了解,恒泰选煤厂最大的客户是一墙之隔的昆钢焦化厂。æ¨æ ‘林称,2013年市场不景气,煤炭卖不出去,收入不行。“从2012年建厂到现在才洗了 7、8万吨煤,收入也就5、6千万元。”他说,“2012年煤价1000å—一吨,2013年跌到800å—每吨,恒泰利润不到2千万元。”

æ¨æ ‘林还说,“由于没有自己的煤,利维泰丰已有一年没做过生意。”

财务人员自æ›è™šå®ž

记者同样以了解招商引资为由,与利维泰丰财务人员赵俊安见é¢ã€‚“恒泰选煤厂是利维泰丰中方投资人(即æ¨è€å¿ ï¼‰è‡ªå·±æŠ•èµ„的厂。”赵俊安说。从2011年底利维泰丰成立起,赵俊安就一直担任公司财务,他称自己对公司情况“相当熟悉”。

“利维泰丰只有一个洗煤厂,就是红星,该厂已于2012å¹´6月因为不景气暂时关闭,”赵俊安进一步表示,“洗煤业务转到恒泰选煤厂。”由于这种“关联关系”,利维泰丰的办公地点也与恒泰选煤厂合并。赵俊安也承认,“红星选煤厂2012å¹´6月份停产后再未纳税。”

赵俊安称利维泰丰主营业务是煤炭批发、销售。2012年利维泰丰总收入约8000万元,2013å¹´6月,营业收入不到4000万元。“洗煤仅在市场 行情好的时候做,不单独计算业务。”而即便恒泰选煤厂为利维泰丰所有,其营业收入也无法占到龙腾矿业声明的39%。记者从上述工信局负责人提供的文件看 到,恒泰矿业2013å¹´1~7月产值为1.4亿元,但亏损é¢å´ä¸º8.3万元。2012年,恒泰矿业利润也仅有852万元。

这个说法与龙腾矿业此前声明的“两处洗煤厂”自相矛盾。曹建灵也向记者证实,利维泰丰是一家经贸公司,主要做煤炭批发、销售生意,并无洗煤业务。问及网站上的声明,曹建灵称“可能是翻译出了问题”,矿业陷入难以自圆其说的境地。

此外,赵俊安不同意æ¨æ ‘æž—“利维泰丰一年没有生意”的说法,而是称 “从2013å¹´4、5月开始到10月才未有产出。”

曲é–市商务部网站2012å¹´1月17日一则通报显示,“2011年美国利维能源公司与中方云南泰丰煤业有限公司合作投资5000万元人民币进行煤炭洗选加工、流通经营项目。其中外方投资670万美元,现到位外资63.9985万美元。”

但记者了解到,作为2011å¹´“昆交会”师宗县招商引资三大成果之一的利维泰丰在当地并无多大名气,利维泰丰还曾在曲é–市2012年外商投资企业联 合年检中被通报批评。招商局局长董红晴甚至根本不知道这家中美合资公司,副局长æœèˆŸå®ä¹Ÿæ˜¯æ‰“了多个电è¯ï¼Œæ‰äº†è§£åˆ°è¯¥å…¬å¸ä¸€äº›ç²—略情况。

而赵俊安对记者称,龙腾矿业截至目前仅向利维泰丰注入资金1500万元人民币。他还透露,按照双方协议,利维泰丰的实际生产、经营成果美方都不过 问,中方只需要按照每年注入金é¢çš„12%回报美方,具体如何回报还要视资金注入时间长短等具体情况而定,“但双方并未结算,可能还再等个三五年之后,双方 再åä¸‹æ¥é‡æ–°å•†é‡ã€‚”

《《《

龙腾矿业旗下多家煤矿æƒå±žå­˜ç–‘ 营业状况与财报不符

每经记者 岳琦 江然 发自成都、贵阳、昆明、毕节

在中国云南和贵州的大山深处,几处不知名的小煤矿牵动ç€çº³æ–¯è¾¾å…‹è‚¡å¸‚中龙腾矿业的起起伏伏。龙腾矿业自2010年开始其煤炭运作以æ¥ï¼Œè¿™å®¶æ¥è‡ªç¾Žå›½çš„公司在中国布下了一场看似严密的资本谜局。

《每日经济新闻》记者在2013å¹´10月底前往贵州和云南多地,就龙腾矿业在华业务一探究竟。5处煤矿,2处洗煤设施,3个煤炭贸易平台,多地办事 处,这是龙腾最近一期财报显示的全部业务æ¿å—。记者通过实地探访,采访政府部门、知情人士等方式发现,龙腾矿业除洗煤业务存在巨é¢è¥æ”¶æ¥æºä¸æ¸…晰外,仍有 煤矿资产æƒå±žã€ç›ˆåˆ©è™šé«˜ç­‰ç–‘点。

此外,记者还发现,公司前董事长æŽç»´æ¾ˆåœ¨é¾™è…¾çŸ¿ä¸šå°†ä¸­å›½è¥¿å—部深山的几处煤炭资产跨境资本化的过程中扮演了重要角色。龙腾矿业4月7日的公告显示,美国司法部已于3月27日对æŽç»´æ¾ˆæèµ·è¯‰è®¼ï¼Œè¢«æŒ‡æŽ§æ¶‰å«Œæ¬ºè¯ˆã€‚

旗下多家煤矿æƒå±žå­˜ç–‘/

龙腾矿业向美国证券交易委员会(SEC)提交的一份10-K财报(以下简称10-K)显示,公司的主要业务为采煤,拥有大普安、树冲、拉苏、罗州、 威奢5大煤矿。其中大普安、树冲煤矿位于云南省境内,剩下三处煤矿在贵州赫章县。而“分销”、“æ´—ç…¤”、“焦化”业务则被公司补充列为“其他煤矿机遇”。

记者从龙腾矿业公布的10-K中获悉,2012å¹´11月18日,龙腾矿业以170万美元现金、忠林焦化厂98%è‚¡æƒä»¥åŠå¤§åªç…¤çŸ¿60%è‚¡æƒï¼Œä»Žè´µå·ž 优能矿业股份有限公司(以下简称优能矿业)和贵州优银控股有限公司 (以下简称优银控股)手中置换了罗州煤矿和拉苏煤矿各95%的股份。

龙腾矿业在2013å¹´10月25日官网发布的公告中改口称,公司通过购入优能矿业两家子公司––贵州优能迅达储运有限公司 (以下简称优能迅达)和贵州优能五洲能源开发有限公司 (以下简称优能五洲)的95%的股份,而间接购买了罗州煤矿和拉苏煤矿,因为优能迅达和优能五洲分别100%控股罗州煤矿和拉苏煤矿。

对于这两处煤矿的交易,2013å¹´10月记者前往拉苏煤矿,该煤矿一位负责人张志告诉记者,拉苏煤矿为优能矿业2010年购买。张志表示,“有其他股东有æƒç›Šï¼Œä½†æ˜¯ï¼ˆä¼˜èƒ½çŸ¿ä¸šï¼‰æ˜¯ç»å¯¹æŽ§è‚¡ï¼Œç”Ÿäº§ç»è¥é”€å”®éƒ½æ˜¯ä¼˜èƒ½çŸ¿ä¸šç»Ÿä¸€ç®¡ç†ã€‚有外国人æ¥è€ƒå¯Ÿè¿‡ï¼Œå…·ä½“是什么关系不清楚。”

记者在位于贵州赫章县的优能矿业见到其行政副总经理宋章,她表示,优能矿业在赫章县拥有包括罗州、拉苏、威奢煤矿在内的7个煤矿。而据赫章县当地媒 体《赫章报》的一篇文章显示,优能矿业以全资收购或控股收购了威奢煤矿、拉苏煤矿、罗州煤矿、城关煤矿、安乐溪煤矿、河镇煤矿、德卓煤矿等7个煤矿,已申 报兼并重组主体资格。

去年1月,贵州省下发《贵州省煤矿企业兼并重组工作方案 (试行)》,要求兼并重组的主体煤矿企业的设计规模不得低于150万吨,其中毕节市、六盘水市的不低于200万吨。龙腾矿业旗下贵州煤矿显然并不符合此项 要求,而在贵州省公布的煤炭兼并重组主体资格名单中,也始终未见龙腾矿业的身影。

记者在威奢煤矿采访时,见到了一位自称龙腾矿业驻矿管理上述3个煤矿的经理刘先生。对于煤矿的归属问题,刘先生表示,为了在贵州煤矿整合中ä¿ç•™ç…¤çŸ¿ï¼Œé¾™è…¾çŸ¿ä¸šå’Œä¼˜èƒ½çŸ¿ä¸šæ——下的煤矿合作,但没有参股到优能矿业,上述3个煤矿,优能矿业是股东而且负责管理。

但当记者提及龙腾矿业对3个煤矿所属的股æƒè¯æ˜Žæ–‡ä»¶æ—¶ï¼Œåˆ˜ç»ç†è¡¨ç¤ºï¼Œæ”¶è´­åè®®ç­‰æ–‡ä»¶éƒ½ä¸åœ¨å…¶æ‰‹ä¸­ï¼Œ“现在也没什么好回应的了,已经进入司法程序。”而龙腾矿业在数次公告回应中,也未能提供有说服力的相关证明ææ–™ã€‚

如据龙腾矿业公告所言,对拉苏煤矿和罗州煤矿的收购在2012年就已完成,但作为收购行为法律ä¾æ®çš„工商登记却不能支持其说法,2013å¹´10月 底,记者从优能矿业等公司的工商信息中获悉,截至2013å¹´9月,优能迅达100%控股罗州煤矿,但龙腾矿业或其子公司并不是优能迅达的股东,优能矿业 100%控股优能迅达。拉苏煤矿90%è‚¡æƒç”±ä¼˜èƒ½çŸ¿ä¸šæŒæœ‰ï¼Œå¦å¤–10%è‚¡æƒä¸ºè‡ªç„¶äººéƒ­åº”全持有。优能五洲唯一100%控股股东为优能矿业且并不拥有拉苏煤 矿的股æƒã€‚

据今年3月上线的全国企业信用信息公示系统显示,目前罗州煤矿股æƒå·²ç”±3位自然人持有,拉苏煤矿目前仅有郭应全一个出资人,威奢煤矿股æƒç›®å‰ä¹Ÿç”±ä¸¤ 名自然人持有。昨日(4月17日),赫章县工业经济贸易和能源局主管煤炭副局长陈启接受 《每日经济新闻》记者电è¯é‡‡è®¿æ—¶è¡¨ç¤ºï¼Œä¼˜èƒ½çŸ¿ä¸šä¸ŠæŠ¥çš„è‚¡æƒç»“构中,威奢煤矿有外资股份,而罗州、拉苏煤矿不涉及外资参股。但他也表示,企业上报的股æƒç»“æž„ 不一定真实,而且整合中的煤矿股æƒå˜æ›´é¢‘繁。

此外,位于云南的大普安煤矿和树冲煤矿归属同样存在悬疑。树冲煤矿在云南省工商部门网站的登记信息显示,该煤矿目前仍为个人独资企业,负责人为æ¨æ°¸ã€‚这与龙腾矿业披露的该矿为合伙企业并不相符。

大普安煤矿所在的师宗县工信局,向记者提供的一份截至2013年7月31日 《师宗县规模上工业企业信息》显示,大普安煤矿为师宗恒泰矿业有限公司旗下企业,该煤矿2012年利润仅490万元,2013年1~7月利润仅41.9万元。

煤矿营业状况与财报“打架”/

除煤矿归属外,记者还发现,龙腾矿业旗下煤矿的营业状况也与其财报难吻合。

据龙腾矿业10-K显示,2013年财年(2012年4月30日至2013年4月30),龙腾矿业营业收入1.98亿美元,上述5大煤矿营业收入 7568.96万美元,销售煤炭66.95万吨。其中大普安煤矿产煤22.8万吨,树冲煤矿13.17万吨,威奢煤矿14.29吨,2012年11月18 日购买的罗州煤矿产煤9.33吨,拉苏煤矿7.32吨。

《每日经济新闻》记者去年10月在赫章县主管部门了解到,该县共有煤矿31座,生产煤矿只有7座,政策性停建煤矿13处,其中大多为年产9万吨或 15万吨煤矿。记者实地走访威奢煤矿时,在通往威奢煤矿的路途中,当地司机表示,近年æ¥ï¼Œè¯¥å¤„道路已经很少见到运煤车辆,所以路况才会好起æ¥ã€‚

2008年开始在威奢煤矿任矿长,2013å¹´9月进入优能矿业工作的蔡矿长表示,威奢煤矿受政策影响,直到2013å¹´8月验收才全部结æŸã€‚截至2013å¹´10月åˆï¼Œæ¯æœˆä»…出工程煤1000多吨,且一年也采不了几个月,累计仅产工程煤约2万吨。

此后,记者还走访了罗州煤矿,通往煤矿的道路上,鲜见运煤车辆经过,而且临近煤矿的一段道路为塌方后便道,大型运煤车辆很难通过,罗州煤矿厂区显得十分平é™ï¼ŒçŸ¿å±±æœºæ¢°ä¹Ÿå¤„于停摆状态。

罗州煤矿后勤部门办公室主任é’先生告诉记者,罗州煤矿虽具备生产æ¡ä»¶ï¼Œä½†ä»Ž2013å¹´9月份开始集团公司就通知煤矿停产,大部分煤矿工作人员已离开煤矿。至于停产的具体原因,é’先生表示并不知情。

拉苏煤矿一位负责人张志也告诉记者,拉苏煤矿属在建煤矿,2013å¹´11月才掘进到达采é¢ï¼Œå¯ä»¥æ­£å¼å¼€é‡‡ã€‚截至2013å¹´10月åˆï¼Œç…¤çŸ¿å‡ºäº§å·¥ç¨‹ç…¤æ¯å¤©çº¦600吨,累计出约10万吨,而工程煤质量一般,虽销售顺利,但售价比正常价格便宜很多,每吨仅售200~400元。

张志还表示,一般煤矿扩产投资要3亿~5亿元资金,“目前盈利是不可能的,投入太大。”而龙腾矿业上述刘经理在采访中也表示,因为政府政策变化很 快,要求从3万吨一级级往上技改,而技改就需停产。且技改后开采方案要重新制定,设备也要更新升级。对于技改升级的资金投入,刘经理表示,肯定是按照控股 比例投入,龙腾矿业方é¢æŠ•å…¥å¾ˆå¤šã€‚

与大客户煤炭交易待核实/

记者了解到,近年æ¥ï¼Œç…¤ç‚­è¡Œä¸šæ•´ä½“低迷,多数中小煤矿在整合中停产或难以正常生产,出现入不敷出的情况。

而龙腾矿业的10-K显示,2013年财年,公司在煤炭分销批发上有4566.28万美元的营业收入,分销煤炭33.16万吨。而据记者了解,龙腾矿业最为主要的分销平台为贵州大欣利维矿业公司(以下简称大欣利维)。

2013å¹´5月,龙腾矿业通过美通社发布消息称,2012å¹´10月,龙腾矿业签署了为大唐下属广西合山电厂供应36万吨煤的协议(为期10个月); 去年11月,龙腾矿业子公司与大唐又签署了最新的合同,将煤炭供应量上调至一年100万吨,从2013å¹´1月开始,龙腾矿业已经根据最åˆçš„合同向大唐发运 了煤炭。

如按照龙腾矿业上述说法,其2013财年几乎所有的煤炭分销业务都æ¥è‡ªäºŽå¹¿è¥¿åˆå±±ç”µåŽ‚的合作。对此,记者曾在贵阳大欣利维的办公室采访了该公司副经 理谢智。谢智明确表示,广西合山电厂为大欣利维的主要客户,但大欣利维还向四å·ç­‰å…¶ä»–省份销售煤炭。在记者采访时,大欣利维工作人员专门将很厚一摞近期销 售记录原始文档摆放在显眼位置,并主动展示给记者看。

但记者发现,广西合山电厂归属于桂冠电力控股子公司––大唐桂冠合山发电有限责任公司 (以下简称合山公司)。桂冠电力去年4月曾发布一则关联交易公告称,合山公司与控股股东中国大唐集团公司的间接控股子公司大唐电力燃料有限公司(以下简称 大唐燃料)签订发电用煤购买协议,购买发电用煤50万吨,合同金é¢ä¸ºå¹´åº¦äº¤æ˜“金é¢(上限)合计约为人民币3.5亿元,此次协议购煤数量约占合山公司全年预 计发电用煤的17%。

桂冠电力的公告还强调称,因本地煤、贵州煤含硫量相对高,发热量也不高,不能满足日趋严格的排放要求,才不得不采购部分低硫高热值的下水煤æ¥æŽºé…ï¼Œ 以满足环ä¿è¾¾æ ‡æŽ’放,节约燃料成本。æ¥è‡ªä¸­å›½ç”µåŠ›ç½‘的消息显示,2012年全年,合山公司21次调整电煤采购价格与æ¡æ¬¾ã€‚且全年掺烧本地煤和贵州高硫煤 150万吨,掺配比例超过50%,节约燃料成本6000多万元。

由此æ¥çœ‹ï¼Œå¤§æ¬£åˆ©ç»´æ¯å¹´100万吨的供应量占到合山公司全年用煤的34%,如果按照掺配比例计算,大欣利维的供应占到合山公司高硫煤的大半。对于火 电企业而言,谁掌握了燃料的主动æƒï¼Œè°å°±æŽŒæ¡äº†“降本增效”的主动æƒã€‚而合山电厂在对关联方大唐燃料的交易时都特别强调不对供应商产生ä¾èµ–。大欣利维如何 能够获得如此大订单成为又一疑点。

对此,桂冠电力董秘张云昨日对《每日经济新闻》记者表示,自己并不知道合山公司与大欣利维有上述煤炭交易。张云称,需要核实这笔交易,但截至发稿,记者未获回复。

数位高管为原美国政要?/

日前,对于龙腾矿业和优能矿业之间错综复æ‚的交易,《每日经济新闻》记者再次拨打优能矿业及关联公司在工商部门留下的联系方式,求证其与龙腾矿业的交易,多个电è¯æŽ¥é€šåŽå¯¹æ–¹è¡¨ç¤ºä¸ºå·¥å•†ä»£åŠžäººå‘˜ï¼Œè€Œè®°è€…此前实地采访,对方å‡ä»¥é«˜ç®¡ä¸åœ¨ä¸ºç”±æ‹’ç»ã€‚

在一系列交易和煤矿运作背后,多次出现龙腾矿业前董事长兼CEOæŽç»´æ¾ˆï¼ˆDicksonLee)的身影。据了解,龙腾矿业在国内运作名称为美国利维能源公司。

《每日经济新闻》记者在云南省工商部门网站获悉, 2010å¹´11月到2013å¹´4月,云南利维泰丰煤业有限公司、云南利维泰丰煤业有限公司昆明分公司、贵州利维煤业有限公司昆明分公司等多个公司先后成立,这些公司的负责人皆显示为æŽç»´æ¾ˆã€‚

æŽç»´æ¾ˆæ›¾å¯¹åª’体表示,期望透过既有的贵州、云南等矿区资源,串联美国清洁煤技术及污染环ä¿å¤„理能力,扩大大西洋能源版图。在龙腾矿业的全球版图上,贵州被认为是基础。

一位自称接触过æŽç»´æ¾ˆåŠå…¶å…¬å¸çš„中国台湾的投资者告诉记者,æŽç»´æ¾ˆæ˜¯ä¼šè®¡å¸ˆå‡ºèº«ï¼Œå¯¹äºŽè´¢åŠ¡æ“ä½œååˆ†ç†Ÿç¨”,聪明、圆滑,接待投资者很周到,都是奔驰接送。

2013å¹´11月16日,æŽç»´æ¾ˆå‰å¾€ä¸­ç§‘院山西煤炭化学研究所访问,并作了题为“美国页岩气与中科院山西煤化所的合作开发项目”的报告。山西煤化所 公布的消息显示,æŽç»´æ¾ˆæ‹¥æœ‰ç¾Žå›½è¯åˆ¸ä¸šæ‰§ç…§ã€‚在1999年至2004年期间曾担任中国香港特别行政区证券内幕交易审判官,负责审判香港上市公司舞弊的法律 案件。

此外,记者还了解到,在龙腾矿业的高管名单中,列有多位前美国高官、政要。龙腾矿业官网等的资料显示,公司副总裁ClaytonFong曾任老布什 时期总统公关联络助理、白宫人事办公室副主任;副董事长峰田正雄(NormanY.Mineta)曾任小布什时期的交通部长、克林顿时期的商务部长;公司 顾问、前董事会成员梅冠芳(EdmundMoy)曾是小布什总统的人事助理,2006年至2010年任美国财政部旗下的美国造币厂主席。

公司高层中也有多位与中国渊源颇深。独立董事博瑞奇(JoeBorich)从尼克æ¾æ”¿åºœæ—¶æœŸå°±è´Ÿè´£ä¸­å›½äº‹åŠ¡ï¼Œ1994至1997年之间担任美国驻中国大使馆上海总领事。

美国研究机构曾做空龙腾矿业/

2013å¹´9月,龙腾矿业被美国一家研究机构做空。美国研究机构GeoInvesting在做空声明中指出,龙腾矿业在过去几年中的一系列并购和对 不同产业的剥离操作其实是“一组投饵再换壳的把戏”,龙腾矿业通过其实从未发生过的置换交易,以及对其从未拥有过的资产的交换实现了对大量资产的控制。

在遭遇做空后,龙腾矿业不是第一时间就核心质疑展开反驳。而是通过高管增持、以股代薪、聘请顾问、出示估值报告等形式竭力提振股价。

2013å¹´9月19日被做空后,龙腾矿业称,迅速成立了由公司董事或关联方组成的独立调查委员会。10月2日,龙腾矿业在北京聘请未名股æƒæŠ•èµ„基金 管理有限公司合伙人王五庆为战略顾问,并称将利用其在北京的关系协助龙腾矿业的清洁能源计划。公开资料显示,王五庆所在公司核心业务为现代农业基金、房地 产基金、股æƒæŠ•èµ„基金及财务顾问。

æŽç»´æ¾ˆåœ¨é¾™è…¾çŸ¿ä¸šé­é‡åšç©ºåŽå§‹ç»ˆæœªå…¬å¼€å‡ºé¢æ¾„清或表态,记者试图联系其私人助理,但最终未获回复。

2013å¹´10月10日,龙腾矿业又公布独立资产调查公司SEE出具报告,称股价被低估,重申资产情况。10月15æ—¥,龙腾矿业又宣布与主要从事污水处理的万源环ä¿é›†å›¢æœ‰é™å…¬å¸åˆä½œã€‚

虽然龙腾矿业公布了反驳做空的公告,但在被做空2个月后,即2013å¹´11月18日,公司因未能向纳斯达克提供所需的“é¢å¤–信息”被停牌。

2013å¹´11月27日,龙腾矿业此前成立的审计和特别独立委员会主席MohanDatwani宣布辞职。Datwani对辞职原因解释称,“该公 司没能就政府和监管部门的调查的程度和范围向我通报所有的信息。其次,该公司没有为了完成独立委员会的工作提供足够的财务支持,尤其是,没能为独立委员会 提供雇佣独立的、合格的法务会计所需要的资金。”

龙腾矿业公司方é¢åˆ™“尊敬地反对”Datwani的说法,指出没有其他董事会成员“表达对于公司信息披露的不满”。至于Datwani的第二æ¡æŒ‡æŽ§ï¼Œé¾™è…¾çŸ¿ä¸šæ–¹é¢åˆ™è¡¨ç¤ºï¼š“没有任何现任董事认同Datwani的观点”,公司没有拒ç»ä»»ä½•è´¢åŠ¡æ”¯å‡ºç”³è¯·ã€‚

随ç€æ—¥å‰SEC和美国司法部对æŽç»´æ¾ˆæèµ·æŽ§è¯‰ï¼Œè¿™åœºè·¨å›½èµ„本谜局将逐渐清晰。

《《《

记者调查发现:

注1:威奢煤矿股æƒç›®å‰ç”±2名自然人持有,2013å¹´8月前仅产出少量工程煤,年产仅2万吨。

注2:罗州煤矿股æƒç”±3名自然人持有,2013年未持续生产。

注3:拉苏煤矿目前仅有自然人郭应全一个出资人,2013年11月才正式开采。

注4:贵州大欣利维煤炭贸易客户单一,实际交易量存疑。

注5:红星选煤厂关闭已2年,从税务等方é¢è¯å®žå…¶ä¸å¯èƒ½äº§ç”Ÿè´¢æŠ¥ä¸­å£°ç§°çš„上千万净利润,利维泰丰还曾被当地政府部门通报批评。注髺:师宗县工信局提 供的资料显示,大普安煤矿为师宗恒泰矿业有限公司旗下煤矿,其2012年利润仅490万元,2013å¹´1~7月利润仅41.9万元,且存在资金严重短缺的 困难。

《《《《

龙腾矿业中国管理人员:æŽç»´æ¾ˆè¢«è¯‰ä¸Žå…¬å¸æ— å…³

每经记者 江然 发自昆明

4月14日,龙腾矿业发布公告称,其准备从纳斯达克退市;此外,其创始人æŽç»´æ¾ˆå·²è¾žåŽ»è‘£äº‹é•¿å…¼CEO职务,并在美国被起诉。

昨日 (4月17),《每日经济新闻》记者再一次致电龙腾矿业子公司云南利维泰丰煤业有限公司昆明分公司副经理曹建灵,对方确认了退市一事,并表示æŽç»´æ¾ˆè¢«è¯‰æ˜¯ “他个人的事情,与公司没有关系了。”曹建灵同时告诉记者,其所在的子公司目前已经搬至云南省曲é–市,运营正常,“但煤炭生意没怎么做了,在转型。”

2013å¹´10月22日,《每日经济新闻》记者首次前往龙腾矿业在昆明市区的办公点,表明身份后,前台工作人员称目前公司无人可接受采访。记者离开 后不久,接到一位自称是龙腾矿业子公司云南利维泰丰煤业有限公司昆明分公司副经理的æ¥ç”µï¼Œå¯¹æ–¹è¡¨ç¤ºå¸Œæœ›èƒ½ä¸Žè®°è€…见é¢ï¼Œæ­¤äººå³æ˜¯æ›¹å»ºçµã€‚

值得注意的是,龙腾矿业官方网站对在华高管的介绍显示,“曹女士拥有30年以上国际贸易操作、规则、运输及信用证交易方é¢ç»éªŒã€‚”作为龙腾矿业诸多拥有海外背景的在华管理人员之一,曹建灵此前是澳大利亚一家能源公司的总经理。

2013å¹´10月23日,记者与曹建灵在昆明市区一家咖啡馆见é¢ï¼Œå¹¶å±•å¼€äº†ä»¥ä¸‹å¯¹è¯ã€‚她当时对记者表示龙腾矿业将在中国对美国做空机构Geo提起诽谤诉讼,同时还将向纳斯达克提交ææ–™ï¼Œé€ä¸€é©³æ–¥Geo对其指控。不过记者发现,曹的多个说法与龙腾矿业此前公告内容矛盾。

昨日,当记者再次求证时,曹建灵又表示,龙腾矿业后æ¥å¹¶æœªé€šè¿‡å¸æ³•é€”径解决此事。

以下是 《每日经济新闻》记者(以下简称NBD)与曹建灵在2013å¹´10月23日的对è¯ã€‚

“Geo不择手段”

NBD:公司对于被Geo做空一事是什么态度?

曹建灵:Geo说的很多都不是事实,在没有跟我们核实的情况下就公布,我们也觉得啼笑皆éžã€‚Geo所谓的调查员从æ¥ä¸æ•¢éœ²é¢ï¼Œè°ƒæŸ¥æ‰€å¼€çš„车牌照也有 问题,帮助Geo发布做空报 å‘Š çš„ 网 ç«™Seekingalfa法人有10个曾用名,这些都不正常。这些人不择手段,就像苍è‡ä¸€æ ·åœ¨æ‰¾ä¸€ä¸ªç¼ï¼Œå…¬å¸ƒå‡ºåŽ»åŽï¼Œé€ æˆè‚¡ä»·ä¸‹è·Œï¼Œè‚¡æ°‘被蒙在鼓里,这对 我们是相当大的伤害。 NBD:Geo已经找过你们了?

曹建灵:Geo现在已与我们美国总部取得联系。中国这边我们要起诉,走司法诉讼,告他们诽谤。美国那边我们也会对纳斯达克提交ææ–™ï¼Œé€æ¡åé©³Geo的指控。他们的证据我们都看过了,相当肤浅。他们对中国国情、国策一点也不了解。

NBD:起诉到哪个阶段了?

曹建灵:目前律师正在整理ææ–™ï¼Œé€’进去后所有的东西你们都能看到公告。我们敢诉讼,所有东西都会齐全,但现在确实正处于搜集、提交ææ–™çš„过程中,具体情况不方便回应。纳斯达克对我们的态度,你们也很快就会知道。我们也为此聘请了独立董事。这给我们增加了很多工作。

NBD:董事长æŽå…ˆç”Ÿä¸ºä½•ä¸€ç›´æ²¡æœ‰å›žåº”此事?

曹建灵:作为一个企业æ¥è¯´ï¼Œæˆ‘们在往前走,有新的发展方向。因为煤矿的高峰期已过,降价比较厉害,美国发电已经不用煤了,中国也慢慢会变,我们也会 发展低碳、清洁能源。所以董事长的很多精力都放在市场的发展上。这并不是一个简单的回应,我们要搜集一整套东西,最后董事各方é¢è®¤å¯ã€‚我个人也不能代表整 个公司的态度,一定会有一个完整的公司答复。

“并鞑1+1=2’那么简单”

NBD:Geo很多指控与煤矿归属æƒæœ‰å…³ï¼Ÿ

曹建灵:中国很多煤矿真正的投资人都不会是真正的法人代表。因为会遇上瓦斯爆炸等危险情况,很多时候要规避风险都要请一个法人代表,我出点钱,但你 并不是真正的拥有者。包括大普安。独资企业没法转让,需要批很多文件,只能以另外的方式合作。比如大普安,æ¨è€å¿ æ˜¯æ³•äººä»£è¡¨ï¼Œä½†æ˜¯æœ‰åè®®ï¼Œæœ‰è‚¡ä»½æ¯”列。一 个企业并鞓1+1=2”那么简单。煤炭企业并不是一句è¯å°±å¯ä»¥è¯´æ¸…楚。我们这些会有完整的ææ–™é€’交给纳斯达克。

NBD:红星选煤厂什么时候关闭的?它的法人代表还是刘彬。

曹建灵:红星选煤厂今年(2013年)停产,但我们很快就会启动。它的工艺比较落后了,过两天会有工艺专家æ¥è¯„估,我们会更改设备,年内就会启动。红星形式上的法人代表叫刘彬。我们也有刘彬的公证,我们委托他。有他的按章,我们的授æƒï¼Œä»¥åŠå¾‹å¸ˆçš„见证。

“可能是翻译有误”

NBD:红星选煤厂2012年就没有交税了?

曹建灵:我们诉讼里会有说明。

NBD:龙腾矿业后æ¥çš„声明还提到一个洗煤厂?

曹建灵:没有,那是利维泰丰下é¢çš„,我们委托他们加工的,这是正常的。

NBD:那跟恒泰什么关系?

曹建灵:恒泰是æ¨è€å¿ çš„,但业务上有合作。协议会提供给司法机关,原æ¥ä¹Ÿåœ¨ç½‘络上跟股民公告过,有文件。

NBD:那有泰丰洗煤厂吗?

曹建灵:没有提到过。关于销售收入,红星总销售是20%,泰丰是19%。

NBD:但是声明里确实提到“选煤业务æ¥è‡ªçº¢æ˜Ÿå’Œæ³°ä¸°”。

曹建灵:那可能是翻译有误。泰丰是贸易公司,销售é¢ä¹Ÿæ²¡æœ‰å åˆ°19%,但具体情况我还需要去核实。

NBD:利维泰丰有一段时间没有生产了。

曹建灵:利维泰丰是贸易公司,它本身不是做洗煤和煤矿的。因为有很多委托业务,所以工作地点也和恒泰合并了。但利维泰丰未æ¥é‡ç‚¹ä¼šæ”¾åœ¨äº‘南曲é–市,辐射师宗、罗平等好几个县。

NBD:我们å°è¯•è¿‡å¾ˆå¤šæ¬¡è”系贵公司,也打电è¯åˆ°åŒ—京,一位张女士表示什么都不知道。

曹建灵:事情发生后,任务都分下æ¥ã€‚北京张女士有些也不是很清楚,不敢贸然答复。

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